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Higher Order Modal Logic∗
Reinhard Muskens
1 Introduction
A logic is called higher order if it allows for quantification (and possibly ab-
straction) over higher order objects, such as functions of individuals, relations
between individuals, functions of functions, relations between functions, etc.
Higher order logic (often also called type theory or the Theory of Types) began
with Frege, was formalized in Russell [46] and Whitehead and Russell [52] early
in the previous century, and received its canonical formulation in Church [14].1
While classical type theory has since long been overshadowed by set theory as a
foundation of mathematics, recent decades have shown remarkable comebacks in
the fields of mechanized reasoning (see, e.g., Benzmüller et al. [9] and references
therein) and linguistics. Since the late 1960’s philosophers and logicians, for
various reasons which we will dwell upon, have started to combine higher order
logic with modal operators (Montague [35, 37, 38], Bressan [11], Gallin [22],
Fitting [19]). This combination results in higher order modal logic, the subject
of this chapter.
The chapter will be set up as follows. In the next section we will look at
possible motivations behind the idea of combining modality and higher order
logic. Then, in section 3, Richard Montague’s system of ‘Intensional Logic’, by
far the most influential of higher order modal logics to date, will be discussed.
This logic will be shown to have some limitations. One of these is that, de-
spite its name, the logic is not fully intensional, as it validates the axiom of
Extensionality. This leads to a series of well-known problems centering around
‘logical omniscience’. Another limitation is that the logic is not Church-Rosser
(it matters in which order λ-conversions are carried out). These limitations can
be overcome and the remaining sections of the chapter will contain an exposition
of a modal type theory that is intensional in two ways: in the sense of being
a modal logic and in the sense that Extensionality does not hold. The logic in
itself is not strong enough to make the usual rules of λ-conversion derivable, but
these rules can consistently be added as an axiomatic extension and in that case
the Church-Rosser property will hold (as an alternative, the rules can be hard-
∗From: P. Blackburn, J.F.A.K. van Benthem, and F. Wolter, editors, The Handbook of
Modal Logic, Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning, Elsevier, Dordrecht, 2006, to appear.
1For a good survey of (non-modal) higher order logic, see van Benthem and Doets [8]; for
a textbook development, Andrews [3].
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wired into the theory, in which case the theory is also Church-Rosser). Section
4 will introduce the basic syntax and semantics of this logic, section 5 will give
a tableau calculus, and section 6 provides some elementary model theory in the
form of a model existence theorem and its usual corollaries, such as generalized
completeness. We conclude with a conclusion.
2 Motivation
Why should one want to combine modality with quantification or abstraction
over objects of higher type? Possible reasons come from areas as diverse as
rational theology, the axiomatization of classical mechanics, the semantics of
natural language, and modal logic itself. Let us look at each of these in turn.
2.1 The Ontological Argument
Anselm (1033–1109) proved the existence of God by defining him as “a being
than which none greater can be thought” and by arguing that, since that defi-
nition can be understood, such a being must “exist in the understanding”. But
if this being exists in the understanding, one can also think of it as existing in
reality and, since real existence is “greater” than mere conceptual existence, the
“being than which none greater can be thought” must truly exist. Otherwise
one could think of an even greater being that did truly exist. Moreover, by an
analogous argument, Anselm comes to the conclusion that it is even impossi-
ble to think of God as nonexistent. For something that cannot be thought of
as nonexisting is greater than something that can be so thought of. It follows
that a “being than which none greater can be thought” cannot merely exist
contingently, otherwise one could think of an even greater being with necessary
existence.
Anselm’s original argument was phrased in ordinary Latin and its lack of
precision may be deemed a weakness by some, but increasingly more precise
variants of the argument have been put forward by Descartes, Leibniz and, more
recently, Gödel [24]. Gödel’s argument centers around “positive” properties
and being a god can be defined as having every positive property. There are
axioms regulating the behaviour of the predicate “positive”, stipulating e.g.
that exactly one of a property or its complement is positive, that, whenever P
is positive and the extension of P necessarily is a subset of that of Q, Q is also
positive, that necessary existence is a positive property, etc., etc. The conclusion
is identical to that of Anselm’s: God necessarily exists (and is unique), but
this time premises and argument are spelled out in great detail (some of the
premises may be hard to swallow, even for those who are willing to accept the
conclusion). The argument combines quantification over properties with the
modal notions of necessity and possibility and as a consequence is naturally
framed in a higher order modal logic. For a recent evaluation of Gödel’s proof,
its history, a precise formalization, and extensive discussion of the argument
and subsequent literature, see Fitting [19].
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2.2 Axiomatization of Classical Mechanics
As a second example of the use of a higher order modal logic, let us briefly men-
tion the proposal in Bressan [11] for a logical foundation of classical mechanics
in general and Mach’s often criticized definition of mass in particular. Mach’s
definition has a counterfactual character and this is where modality comes in.
Suppose we have a particle M , whose mass is to be established. Fix some in-
ertial frame. If a particle M1 with unit mass and velocity v1 parallel to M ’s
velocity v were to collide with M at time t, then, if the changes in the velocities
of M and M1 at t would be ∆v 6= 0 and ∆v1 respectively, the mass of M would
be ∆v1/∆v. This means that the mass of M can be established experimentally,
but, as Bressan points out, in an axiomatic foundation of physics it is important
that the axioms do not imply that the experiment actually takes place, as many
physically possible situations that one wants to be able to describe are in fact
incompatible with such an assumption. Thus, Bressan argues, an axiomatiza-
tion based on a modal logic is required. Bressan’s logic is not only modal but
also higher order, as it essentially replaces set theory and concepts such as nat-
ural number and real number should therefore be definable within the logic (for
example, the natural number n is defined as the property of having n elements,
λF.∃nxFx, with ∃n the obvious abbreviation, in Frege’s way).
2.3 The Semantics of Natural Language
A third illustration of the use of higher order modal logic comes from Richard
Montague’s [36, 37, 38] contributions to the semantics of natural language, work
that truly revolutionized the subject.2 It was Montague’s aim to treat the
semantics of natural language in a completely precise way and to provide a
truth definition for sentences of (say) English very much in accordance with the
usual Tarski truth definition for logical languages. One way to achieve this is to
directly assign modeltheoretic objects to syntactic expressions. This road was
taken in Montague [36], but a way that is easier to go in practice is to translate
expressions of English to an interpreted logical language. The interpretation of
the logic then indirectly provides a model theory for the fragment of English
under consideration. This is done in Montague [37, 38]. The logic used is higher
order and modal.
Why did Montague use a logic that combined modality with higher order
quantification and abstraction? It is not difficult to see why one should want a
modal logic for the treatment of natural language, as the latter abounds with
phrases and constructions that have motivated modal logics in the first place
(temporal operators, counterfactuals, true modals like can, might and would,
propositional attitude verbs, and so on). But the reason for employing a higher
order logic may be less clear to logicians not working in linguistics. Although
natural language is able to quantify over properties and in general can express
things that are not normally expressible with first order means only (think of
2The presentation here is inspired by Montague’s work but deviates from it in many minor
details.
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sentences like most men have green eyes, for example), this is not the sole or
even the primary reason for using type theory in linguistics. The main reason is
that in type theory the availability of lambda-abstraction allows for a closure of
the gap between the syntactic forms of natural language expressions and those
of their logical translations.
Let us illustrate this with the help of the simple example sentence in (1a).
Linguists almost universally provide this sentence with a constituent structure
along the lines of (1b), i.e. the determiner every is thought to form a con-
stituent (a noun phrase) with the noun elephant and this resulting constituent
then forms another constituent (a sentence) with the verb phrase danced. Essen-
tially, therefore, the linguistic analysis of such sentences follows the pre-Fregean
pattern of dividing each sentence in a subject (here every elephant) and a pred-
icate (danced).
(1) a. every elephant danced
b. [[every elephant] danced]
c. ∀x (Ex→ Dx)
d. (((λP1λP2.∀x (P1x→ P2x))E)D)
The analysis of natural language expressions as consisting of larger and larger
clusters of constituents is an important feature of modern linguistic theory,
and syntacticians are in the possession of a whole battery of empirical tests to
determine constituenthood, but the syntactic form that is given to any sentence
is not in general congruent with its usual logical form. The structure in (1b),
for example, is fundamentally different from that of the logical sentence (1c),
the usual translation of (1a). While the constituents elephant and danced in
(1b) reappear in (1c) as E and D respectively, there are no continuous parts of
(1c) corresponding to every or every elephant. This gap between logical form
and linguistic form is what logicians such as Russell and Quine had in mind
when they alluded to the misleading form of natural language: the ‘correct’
form of (1a) according to this perspective is (1c); (1b) merely misleads. This
point of view could never be shared by the linguistic community, as giving up
the standard notion of constituenthood would greatly diminish the predictive
power of syntactic theory.
Can the gap be bridged? Here lambdas come to the rescue, for in a higher
order logic with lambda abstraction (1c) can alternatively be written as (1d).
While (1c) is the β-normal form of (1d), the latter, but not the former, follows
the syntactic pattern in (1b). Lambdas allow us to have our cake and eat it.
They allow us to maintain the view that the logical form of an expression closely
mirrors its syntactic form without having to give up the usual logical analysis.
In fact, with lambdas in hand, it is now possible to think of inductive trans-
lation mechanisms sending syntactic forms to logical forms. In the present
case one can translate every as λP1λP2.∀x (P1x → P2x), a term containing
two λ-abstractions over predicates, elephant can be translated as the predicate
constant E and dances as D. If one lets onstituent formation correspond to
application, [every elephant] translates as (λP1λP2.∀x (P1x → P2x))E, which
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reduces to λP2.∀x (Ex → P2x) (a generalized quantifier), and a further step
shows that (1b) translates as (1d), or, equivalently, (1c).
But now a difficulty crops up. If [every elephant] translates as λP2.∀x (Ex→
P2x), how are we going to translate the verb phrase [fed [every elephant]] in (2b),
the syntactic analysis of (2a)? The verb fed should presumably be translated
as some binary relation F between individuals and this is not the kind of object
that λP2.∀x (Ex→ P2x) can apply to (or that can apply to that term).
Montague solved this by complicating the translations of transitive verbs like
fed. He translated fed not simply as F , but as the term λQλx.Q(Fx)3 (with Q
ranging over quantifiers and x over individuals), and if the translations for a and
girl are chosen to be λP1λP2.∃x (P1x∧P2x) and G respectively, the translation
in (2c) results, as the reader may care to verify.
(2) a. a girl fed every elephant
b. [[a girl][fed [every elephant]]]
c. ∃x (Gx ∧ ∀y (Ey → Fxy))
d. ∀y (Ey → ∃x (Gx ∧ Fxy))
Translating an intransitive verb like fed as λQλx.Q(Fx), and not as the simpler
and more intuitive binary relation symbol F , seems ad hoc, however. In fact,
researchers in the Montague tradition have argued that a combination of giving
simple translations with providing systematic ways of obtaining certain trans-
lations from others is not only more elegant than Montague’s original approach
was, but also gives a better fit with the data (Partee and Rooth [44], Hendriks
[26, 27]). Discussing the calculi for ‘shifting’ translations that these authors have
proposed would lead us too far afield here. Suffice it to say that from their con-
siderations, in conjunction especially with those of van Benthem [7], the picture
emerges that linear combinators4 play an all-important role. The translation of
fed as λQλx.Q(Fx), for example, can be thought to result from applying the
linear combinator λRλQλx.Q(Rx) to a basic translation F , while applying the
combinator λRλQ1λQ2.Q1(λy.Q2(λx.Rxy)) to F results in a translation that
eventually leads to (2d), another possible translation of the original sentence.5
For more information on Montague’s approach to the semantics of natural
language, see the textbooks Dowty et al. [15] and Gamut [23], the survey in
Partee with Hendriks [43], and the chapter on Linguistics by Moss and Tiede
3For the sake of exposition I am disregarding Montague’s intensional operators here.
4A combinator is a closed λ-term built from variables with the help of λ-abstraction and
application only. A combinator M is linear if each abstractor λX in M binds exactly one X
in M .
5While linear combinators play an important role in semantic composition, just letting
them apply to semantic translations without further ado results in serious overgeneration.
Applying the permutation operator λRλyλx.Rxy to F above, for example, would allow the
derivation of translations for a girl fed every elephant that are normally associated with an
elephant fed every girl. Partee and Rooth [44] and Hendriks [26, 27] provide calculi in which
permutation is not derivable, while de Groote [25] and Muskens [40, 41] base their grammars
entirely on linear lambda terms but make sure that any permutation in semantics is mirrored
by a permutation in syntax.
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in this handbook (chapter 19). Montague’s higher order modal logic IL will be
described shortly.
2.4 Modal Logics with Propositional Quantifiers
Motives inherent in modal logic itself may also lead to a combination of modality
with higher order, or at least second order, quantification. The standard defini-
tion of the truth of a formula in a frame at a world is defined with the help of a
quantification over valuations and therefore essentially corresponds to universal
quantification over sets of possible worlds. More precisely, the frame truth of
a formula ϕ containing proposition letters p1, . . . , pn corresponds to the truth
of a formula ∀P1 . . . Pnϕ
′, where ϕ′ is the standard translation ST (ϕ) of ϕ; see
chapter 1 by Blackburn and van Benthem in this handbook. This gives global
second order quantification, with the second order universal quantifiers taking
scope over the whole formula, but one may now be inspired to add quantifiers
∀p and ∃p ranging over sets of possible worlds to given modal logics. This was
done in Kripke [33] and modal logics with propositional quantifiers have been
studied by a variety of authors since, amongst whom are Bull [12], Fine [16],
Kaplan [30], Kremer [32, 31], Fitting [18], and ten Cate [13], to name but a few.
Semantically there are two lines of attack here. If one has a frame 〈W,R〉,
the most obvious interpretation of quantifiers ∀p and ∃p in that frame lets them
range over the power set P(W ) of the set of possible worldsW . This is called the
second order (or primary) interpretation of propositional quantifiers. If propo-
sitional quantifiers are added to a modal logic L in this way (where L = S4, S5,
etc.), the resulting logic is called Lπ+. The behaviour of the logics thus obtained
rather varies. S5π+, on the one hand, is decidable (Fine [16], Kaplan [30]), as
this logic is embeddable into monadic second order logic. (The embedding es-
sentially is the standard translation, with clauses such as ST (ϕ) = ∀xST (ϕ)
and ST (∀pϕ) = ∀P ST (ϕ).) Fine and Kaplan also axiomatize S5π+. The log-
ics Kπ+, Tπ+, K4π+, B4π+, S4.2π+, and S4π+, on the other hand, are
recursively isomorphic to full second order logic (this was proved independently
by Kripke and Fine; Fine [16] has a weaker result).
In order to obtain nice proof systems for modal logics with propositional
quantification, one can also follow the example of Henkin [28], who, in the
context of higher order logic, defined a class of models in which higher order
quantifiers do not necessarily range over all subsets of the relevant domains,
but only over designated subsets of them. In the present context such a set-up
means that frames 〈W,R〉 are replaced by triples 〈W,R,Π〉 such that Π ⊆ P(W ).
Here Π must be closed under boolean operations, including arbitrary unions
and intersections and it must be the case that R[P ] ∈ Π and R−1[P ] ∈ Π
whenever P ∈ Π (see e.g. Thomason [50], who considers such structures for tense
logics). Propositional quantification is now interpreted as quantification over Π.
This is the so-called first order (or secondary) interpretation of propositional
quantifiers. The resulting logics are denoted as S4π, S5π, etc., according to
the constraints that are put on accessibility relations R. All these logics are
axiomatizable with the help of reasonable axioms.
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How does the axiomatization of S5π that one gets in this way (basically
the usual S5 axioms and rules + the usual quantification axioms and rules for
propositional quantification) compare to the one obtained by Fine and Kaplan?
Curiously, an axiomatization of S5π+ requires one additional axiom, namely
(3) ∃p(p ∧ ∀q(q → (p→ q)))
A little reflection shows that if this formula is evaluated in a world w in a frame
〈W,R〉 using the primary interpretation, it is true, with {w} as a sole witness for
p. On the other hand, evaluation with respect to w in a frame 〈W,R,Π〉 may not
result in truth, as there may be no P ∈ Π such that w ∈ P and P ⊆ P ′ for all
P ′ such that w ∈ P ′ ∈ Π. A very similar situation obtains in higher order logic.
In the models of Henkin [28] sets may be so sparse that there are not enough of
them to distinguish between objects that are in fact not identical. Two distinct
objects d1 and d2 may have exactly the same properties, and in particular {d1}
may fail to exist (Andrews [2]). In a modal context definability of singleton
sets {w} can be enforced through the introduction of nominals (Blackburn et
al. [10], Areces and ten Cate, chapter 14 of this handbook).
3 Montague’s Intensional Logic
In the previous section we have explained some of Montague’s ideas with the
help of a non-modal logic, but Montague himself actually framed them in IL
(Intensional Logic), a higher order modal logic that will be discussed in this
section (see also Moss and Tiede’s chapter 19 of this handbook). The logic is
an extension of Church’s [14] theory of types and inherits many, though not all,
of the latter’s properties. After giving a brief overview of IL we will point out
some of the logic’s limitations.
3.1 Overview of IL
In order to set up the logic, one first needs to define a simple type system.
Definition 1. The set of IL types is the smallest set of strings such that:
(i) e and t are IL types;
(ii) If α and β are IL types, then (αβ) is an IL type;
(iii) If α is an IL type, then (sα) is an IL type.
Here the type e is the type of entities, while t is the type of truth-values. Note
that, while s can be used to form complex IL types, it is not itself an IL type.
The intended interpretation of the types defined here is that objects of a type
αβ (also written α→ β) are functions from objects of type α to objects of type
β and that objects of type sα are functions from the set of possible worlds to
objects of type α.
The next step is to define the terms of IL. It will be assumed that each IL
type α comes with a denumerably infinite set of variables and a countable set
of constants. Terms are built up from these as follows.
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Definition 2. Define, for each IL type α, the set of IL terms Tα as follows.
(i) Every constant or variable of any type α is an element of Tα;
(ii) If A ∈ Tαβ and B ∈ Tα, then (AB) ∈ Tβ;
(iii) If A ∈ Tβ and x is a variable of type α then (λx.A) ∈ Tαβ;
(iv) If A,B ∈ Tα then (A ≡ B) ∈ Tt;
(v) If A ∈ Tα then (ˆA) ∈ Tsα;
(vi) If A ∈ Tsα then (ˇA) ∈ Tα.
So we have application and abstraction, identity, and “cap” and “cup” operators
that, as we will see, are very much analogous to application and abstraction.
If A ∈ Tα we will often indicate that fact by writing Aα. Terms of type t are
called formulas and we often use metavariables ϕ, ψ, etc. to range over them.
Definition 2 does not seem to provide us with the expressivity that we want,
as the common logical operators, including the modal  and ♦ seem to be
absent, but in fact such operators are definable from the ones just adopted
(Henkin [29], Gallin [22]).
Definition 3. Write
> for (λxt.x) ≡ (λxt.x),
⊥ for (λxt.x) ≡ (λxt.>),
¬ϕ for ⊥ ≡ ϕ,
ϕ ∧ ψ for (λftt.fϕ ≡ ψ) ≡ (λftt.f>),
∀xαϕ for (λxα.ϕ) ≡ (λxα.>), and
ϕ for ˆϕ ≡ ˆ>.
Other operators will have their usual definitions.
Whether these abbreviations make sense can be checked as soon as we are
in the possession of a semantics for the language. So let us turn to that.
Definition 4. A (standard) model for IL is a triple 〈D,W, I〉 such that D and
W are non-empty sets and I is a function with the set of all constants as its
domain, such that I(c) ∈ Dsα for each constant c of type α, where the sets Dα
are defined using the following induction.
De = D
Dt = {0, 1}
Dαβ = {F | F : Dα → Dβ}
Dsα = {F | F : W → Dα}.
The function I is called an interpretation function. Intuitively, we interpret D
as a domain of possible individuals and W as a set of possible worlds.
In order to interpret terms on models, we additionally need to define an as-
signment to M = 〈D,W, I〉 as a function a with the set of all variables as its
domain, such that a(x) ∈ Dα if x is of type α. The notation a[d/x] is defined
as usual. Terms can now be evaluated on models with the help of a Tarski-style
truth definition.
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Definition 5. The value ‖A‖M,w,a of a term A on a model M = 〈D,W, I〉 in
world w ∈ W under an assignment a to M is defined in the following way:
(i) ‖c‖M,w,a = I(c)(w) if c is a constant; ‖x‖M,w,a = a(x) if x is a variable;
(ii) ‖AB‖M,w,a = ‖A‖M,w,a(‖B‖M,w,a);
(iii) ‖λxβA‖
M,w,a = the function F with domain Dβ such that F (d) = ‖A‖
M,w,a[d/x]
for all d ∈ Dβ;
(iv) ‖A ≡ B‖M,w,a = 1 iff ‖A‖M,w,a = ‖B‖M,w,a;
(v) ‖ˆA‖M,w,a = the function F with domain W such that F (w′) = ‖A‖M,w
′,a
for all w′ ∈W ;
(vi) ‖ˇA‖M,w,a = ‖A‖M,w,a(w);
Note the special treatment of the non-logical constants in the first clause of
this definition: constants of type α are interpreted as functions of type sα by
the interpretation function I but these functions are applied to the current
world in order to get the actual value, an object which is of type α again.
The second and third clauses interpret application and abstraction in a way
that is to be expected. The fourth clause interprets ≡ as identity relative to a
possible world, i.e. A ≡ B means that A and B have the same extension in the
world of evaluation, not necessarily in all possible worlds. The last two clauses
interpret the cap and cup operators in a way that is analogous to abstraction
and application; cap is abstraction over possible worlds while cup is application
to the current world. We leave it to the reader to verify that the abbreviations
of definition 3 provide the operators defined there with their usual semantics
(with  the universal modality).
A formula ϕ is true in a model M in world w under an assignment a if
‖ϕ‖M,w,a = 1. The notion of standard entailment, or s-entailment for short, is
defined accordingly.
Definition 6. Let Γ and ∆ be sets of IL formulae. We say that Γ s-entails ∆,
Γ |=s ∆, if, whenever M = 〈D,W, I〉 is a model, w ∈W , and a is an assignment
to M , ‖ϕ‖M,w,a = 1 for all ϕ ∈ Γ implies ‖ψ‖M,w,a = 1 for some ψ ∈ ∆.
While it is clear from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem that the relation |=s can
have no recursive axiomatization, it is possible to define a generalized notion of
entailment |=g that can be so axiomatized. For Church’s logic this was done
in Henkin [28], while Gallin [22] (in general a rich source of information about
Montague’s logic) generalizes the completeness proof found there to the setting
of IL. The |=g notion is obtained with the help of generalized (or: Henkin)
models, the main difference between these and standard models being that,
while for each α and β it must hold that Dαβ ⊆ {F | F : Dα → Dβ}, the Dαβ
need not be the entire function spaces {F | F : Dα → Dβ}. Similarly, it is
only required that Dsα ⊆ {F | F : W → Dβ}. We will not pursue the proof of
Henkin (or: generalized) completeness for IL here, but refer to Gallin’s original
work. For a generalized completeness proof for a similar higher order modal
logic, see section 6.
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3.2 Limitations of IL
Montague’s work has been a tremendous boost for natural language semantics
but with the advantage of hindsight it is possible to point out some shortcomings
of the logic that he used. These limitations will be reviewed here. First, let us
ask ourselves the question whether the logic lives up to its name. Is IL really an
intensional logic? If “intensional” merely is another word for “modal” there can
be no discussion, but there is an older definition of the concept of intensionality
that makes perfect sense in a higher order context and in which sense IL is not
intensional. Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica [52, number *20] is
one place where this definition can be found. In this work a distinction between
extensional and intensional functions of functions is made and Whitehead and
Russell give as “the mark of an extensional function f” a condition which in
their notation reads
(4) ϕ!x. ≡x .ψ!x :⊃ϕ,ψ: f(ϕ!ẑ). ≡ .f(ψ!ẑ)
but which in the present setting can be written as
(5) ∀gh(∀x(gx ≡ hx)→ fg ≡ fh)
Thus a function of functions f is extensional if, whenever f is applied to a
function g, the resulting value fg depends only on the extension of g; a function
of functions is intensional if not extensional.6
Whitehead and Russell point out that contexts of propositional attitude
such as “I believe that p” are examples of functions that are not extensional
and hence intensional. However, it is immediately clear that in IL all functions
of functions are extensional in the sense of (5) and that intensional functions
are ruled out. IL conforms to the following form of the axiom of Extensionality:
(6) ∀f∀gh(∀x(gx ≡ hx)→ fg ≡ fh)
For an Intensional Logic this seems below par. The situation is alleviated in a
sense by the fact that the following scheme (in which ϕ{P := F} denotes the
result of substituting the constant F for the variable P in ϕ) is not generally
valid.
(7) ∀x(Fx ≡ Hx)→ (ϕ{P := F} ≡ ϕ{P := H})
For example, one does not have
(8) ∀x(Fx ≡ Hx)→ ((H ≡ F ) ≡ (H ≡ H)) ,
as it is easy to construct a model in which H and F are coextensive at some
point but not at another. This is desirable, since from the premise that all
6Whitehead and Russell only consider propositional functions and as a consequence their
f , if it had been typed in our way, would have received a type of the form (αt)t (so that ≡
can be read as ↔). In IL the scheme in (5) will be valid for f of any type (αβ)γ (with g and
h of type αβ and x of type α).
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and only humans are featherless bipeds (to take a truly Russellian example) it
should not follow that being a featherless biped necessarily is being human.
But now there is room for a second point of criticism, for how come (6) can
be valid while (7) is not? Surely, one can always instantiate g as the constant
F , h as H , f as λP. ϕ and from
(9) ∀x(Fx ≡ Hx)→ ((λP.ϕ)F ≡ (λP.ϕ)H)
get (7) with the help of two β-conversions? The answer is that β-conversion
unfortunately is not generally valid in IL but is subject to side conditions ad-
ditional to the usual constraint on substitutability. (λP.(H ≡ P ))F , for ex-
ample, is not semantically equivalent to (H ≡ F ), as the reader may care to
verify.
We will turn to the side conditions on β-conversion shortly, but first, as
a third criticism, let us notice that, while the scheme in (7) is not valid, the
strengthened version in (10) does hold in all models at any possible world (the
proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ).
(10) ∀x(Fx ≡ Hx)→ (ϕ{P := F} ≡ ϕ{P := H})
But this is far from desirable. Read “is provable with the help of Zorn’s Lemma”
for F and “is provable with the help of the Axiom of Choice” for H while
choosing “John believes that Zorn’s Lemma is P” for ϕ. It is presumably a
necessary fact that everything that is provable with the help of Zorn’s Lemma
is provable with the help of the Axiom of Choice and vice versa. But from
“John believes that Zorn’s Lemma is provable from Zorn’s Lemma” one cannot
conclude “John believes that Zorn’s Lemma is provable from the Axiom of
Choice”. Hence (10) should in fact not be valid. This is what is usually called
the problem of logical omniscience but is really a consequence of one variant of
the Extensionality principle.
Let us consider the side conditions on β-conversion in IL. They will unfor-
tunately lead to a fourth problem. Define a term to be modally closed if it is
built up from variables and terms of the form ˆA with the help of application,
λ-abstraction and ≡. The following scheme is valid.
(11) (λxαAβ)Bα ≡ A{x := B}, if
(a) B is free for x in A, and
(b) either no free occurrence of x in A lies within the scope of ˆ or B is
modally closed.
This is in fact one of the six axiom schemes that are used to axiomatize gen-
eralized consequence in Gallin [22]. But, as was observed by Friedman and
Warren [21], the second side condition that needs to be imposed here destroys
one of the attractive properties that lambda calculi usually have. For notions
of reduction  such as β or βη (see Barendrecht [4] for definitions), one
can often establish that whenever A  A1 and A  A2 there is an A3 such
that A1  A3 and A2  A3, i.e. it is immaterial in which order reductions are
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made. This so-called Church-Rosser property is not retained in IL as Friedman
and Warren show with the help of (12).
(12) (λxα(λyα.ˆy ≡ fα(sα)x)x)cα
Here x, y, and f are variables, while c is a constant. One possible reduction
leads to
(13) (λy.ˆy ≡ fc)c ,
while another reduction of (12) results in
(14) (λx.ˆx ≡ fx)c .
Neither of these terms can be reduced any further (as c is not modally closed
but the variable that is abstracted over lies in the scope of ˆ) and hence there
is no single term to which both reduce.
Gallin [22] gives a translation of IL into a two-sorted variant TY2 of Church’s
original logic, which has an extra type s for possible worlds. The translation
proceeds by letting ˆ correspond to λ-abstraction over a fixed variable xs, while
ˇ corresponds to application to xs (the translation is related to the standard
translation of modal logic into first order logic). Constants are translated as the
result of application of a constant to the fixed type s variable. This translation
clarifies the behaviour of IL in many circumstances. For example, since a term
that is not modally closed will translate to a term containing a free occurrence of
xs, the side condition (ii) in (11) in a sense reduces to side condition (i) after all.
Since the logic TY2 is just Church’s logic (but two-sorted), it is Church-Rosser,
but the difficulty of not being intensional is shared between IL and TY2.
4 A Modal Type Theory
In the previous section Montague’s logic IL was described and various criticisms
were levelled against it. In this and the next few sections we will propose a logic
MTT that is compatible with the usual (α), (β) and (η) rules and that is
intensional in the sense that two relations can have the same extension yet be
different. In order to obtain this logic we must deviate from IL in two respects.
First, we shall follow Bressan [11] in letting the value of an expression AB in
some world w depend not only on (the value of A and) the value of B in w, but
possibly on the values of B in other worlds as well. This immediately solves the
problem with β-conversion, as no extra side conditions on that rule will then be
necessary.7
For the second deviation from IL, and indeed from the usual semantics for
Church’s [14] classical type logic, a class of models will be considered that is a
further generalization of the generalized models considered in Henkin [28]. These
7See also N. Belnap’s foreword to Bressan [11], especially point 11, where this “nonexten-
sional predication” (nonextensional in the modal sense, not in the stronger sense used in this
chapter) is called Bressan’s cardinal innovation.
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intensional models, as they will be called here, derive from the structures consid-
ered in the proofs of cut elimination in Takahashi [49] and Prawitz [45]. The lat-
ter also play an important role in Andrews’ [1] proof that his (non-extensional)
resolution calculus corresponds to the first six axioms of Church [14]. The struc-
tures considered by these authors are proof-generated and are defined on the
basis of a purely syntactic notion (Schütte’s [47] semivaluations), but recently
purely semantic, stand-alone, generalizations of such models have been offered
in Fitting [19] (‘generalized Henkin models’) and in Benzmüller et al. [9] (‘Σ-
models’). Fitting’s models involve a non-standard interpretation of abstraction,
while the models of Benzmüller et al. have a non-standard form of application,
but these complications seem unnecessary, as our intensional models will do
without them.
Intensional models will serve two purposes. The first is that they deal with
problems of logical omniscience. A second use is technical: the notion of en-
tailment one gets from intensional models is easily axiomatized with the help of
a cut free tableau calculus. This second point will be dwelled upon below; for
the first point consider the following example. While it is reasonable to assume
that sentences (15a) and (15b) determine the same set of possible worlds, it is
not reasonable to assume that applying the function “Mary knows that p” to
(15a) necessarily results in the same value as applying that function to (15b):
(15c) might be true while (15d) is false. Intensional models provide a way to
make the necessary distinction. The idea will be that co-entailment, or, more
generally, having the same extension in all models, will not imply identity, i.e.
the axiom of Extensionality will not hold.
(15) a. The cat is out if the dog is in
b. The dog is out if the cat is in
c. Mary knows that the cat is out if the dog is in
d. Mary knows that the dog is out if the cat is in
4.1 Types and Terms
Unlike IL, which is based on hierarchies of functions, the logic MTT will be
based on hierarchies of relations (Orey [42], Schütte [47]), as relational models
are pleasant to work with. Some definitions therefore must be changed and we
shall start with the definition of types. Assume that some set B of basic types,
among which must be the type s of possible worlds, is given.
Definition 7. The set T of types is the smallest set of strings over the al-
phabet B ∪ {〉, 〈} such that (i) B ⊆ T and (ii) if α1, . . . , αn ∈ T (n ≥ 0) then
〈α1 . . . αn〉 ∈ T .
Types formed with clause (ii) of this definition will be called complex. The com-
plex type 〈〉, obtained by letting n = 0 in (ii), will be the type of propositions ;
this will also be the type of formulas, which will have sets of possible worlds
as their extensions. In general, extensions for terms of type 〈α1 . . . αn〉 will be
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n + 1-ary relations, with one argument place for a possible world (the world
where the relation is evaluated) and one for each of the αi. Note that we have
defined types to be certain strings, so that there is a difference between (say) the
type s and the type 〈s〉. The latter is associated with a set of possible worlds in
each world, or, equivalently, with the type of binary relations between worlds.
Any of these relations can be viewed as an accessibility relation.
A language will be a countable set non-logical constants such that each
constant has a unique type. If L is a language, the set of constants from L
having type α is denoted Lα. For each α ∈ T we assume the existence of a
denumerably infinite set Vα of variables of type α, such that Vα ∩ Vβ = ∅ if
α 6= β. We let V =
⋃
α∈T Vα. In proofs it will occasionally be useful to be able
to refer to fixed well-orderings <L and <V on languages L and on the set V
respectively, so we will assume that these are in place as well.
The following definition gives terms in all types. Apart from variables and
non-logical vocabulary, there will be application and abstraction, and a basis
for defining the usual connectives and quantifiers. Moreover, for any term R of
type 〈s〉 there will be a modal operator 〈R〉 and a term R` intended to denote
the converse of R.
Definition 8. Let L be a language. Define sets TLα of terms of L of type α,
for each α ∈ T , as follows.
(i) Lα ⊆ T
L
α and Vα ⊆ T
L
α for each α ∈ T
(ii) If A ∈ TL〈βα1...αn〉 and B ∈ T
L
β , then (AB) ∈ T
L
〈α1...αn〉
(iii) If A ∈ TL〈α1...αn〉 and x ∈ Vβ, then (λx.A) ∈ T
L
〈βα1...αn〉
(iv) ⊥ ∈ TL〈〉
(v) If ϕ ∈ TL〈〉 and ψ ∈ T
L
〈〉 then ϕ→ ψ ∈ T
L
〈〉
(vi) If ϕ ∈ TL〈〉 and x ∈ Vα then ∀xϕ ∈ T
L
〈〉
(vii) If R ∈ TL〈s〉 and ϕ ∈ T
L
〈〉 then 〈R〉ϕ ∈ T
L
〈〉
(viii) If R ∈ TL〈s〉 then R
` ∈ TL〈s〉
The operation of taking converses will be useful in applications where the notion
arises naturally, such as in temporal logic where, if < is used to denote the
relation of temporal precedence, 〈<〉 will be Prior’s future operator F and 〈<`〉
(or 〈>〉 after an obvious abbreviation) his past operator P .
We will write TL for the set of all terms of the language L, i.e. for the union⋃
α∈T T
L
α . If A is a term of type α, we may indicate this by writing Aα and we
will use ϕ, ψ, χ for terms of type 〈〉, i.e. formulas. The notions free and bound
occurrence of a variable and the notion B is free for x in A are defined as usual,
as are closed terms and sentences. Substitutions are functions σ from variables
to terms such that σ(x) has the same type as x. If σ is a substitution then the
substitution σ′ such that σ′(x) = A and σ′(y) = σ(y) for all y 6≡ x is denoted
as σ[x := A]. If A is a term and σ is a substitution, Aσ, the extension of σ to
A, is defined in the usual way. The substitution σ such that σ(xi) = Ai and
σ(y) = y if y /∈ {x1, . . . , xn} is written as {x1 := A1, . . . , xn := An}.
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Parentheses in terms will often be dropped on the understanding that as-
sociation is to the left, i.e. ABC is ((AB)C). The operators >, ¬, ∧, ∨, ↔
and ∃ are obtained as usual. The following definition gives some other useful
operators.
Definition 9. We will write
=〈αα〉 for λxαλyα∀z〈α〉(zx→ zy),
[R]ϕ for ¬〈R〉¬ϕ,
♦ϕ for 〈λxs.>〉ϕ,
ϕ for [λxs.>]ϕ, and
Ȧ for ∀x〈s〉[x]x
`As.
The first of these abbreviations gives equalities of type 〈αα〉 for each α. Of
course we will usually write A = B instead of =AB. The second abbreviation
introduces the usual dual to 〈·〉 and, for example, allows us to write [<] for
Prior’s G and [>] for his H . The second and third conventions let us write ♦
and  for the global possibility and necessity operators, which have the universal
relation on worlds as their underlying accessibility relation. The abbreviation Ȧ,
lastly, introduces what are called nominals (see Blackburn et al. [10] or Areces
and ten Cate, chapter 14 of this handbook, for much more on these). As will
become apparent below, Ȧ will be true in a world w if and only if w is denoted
by A.
4.2 Standard Models
Before we introduce the intensional models that will interpret MTT terms, let
us have a brief look at a class of models that, in order to conform to general
usage, will be called standard (even though for many practical purposes the
intensional models defined below will be preferred).
Definition 10. A standard collection of domains is a set D = {Dα | α ∈ T }
such that Dα 6= ∅ if α is basic, Dα ∩Dβ = ∅ if α 6= β and α and β are basic,
while D〈α1...αn〉 = P(Ds × Dα1 × · · · × Dαn) for each D〈α1...αn〉. A standard
model is a pair 〈D, J〉 such that D = {Dα | α ∈ T } is a standard collection of
domains and J is a function with the set of all constants as its domain, such
that J(c) ∈ Dα for each constant c of type α. J is called the interpretation
function of 〈D, J〉.
Letting the interpretation function J send constants of type α directly to Dα
diverges from the set-up in IL, but is in conformity with Church’s original logic.
It will bring the behaviour of constants in line with that of free variables.
An assignment a for a standard collection of domains D = {Dα | α ∈ T } is
a function which has the set of variables V as domain and has the property that
a(x) ∈ Dα if x ∈ Vα. The usual notational conventions for assignments obtain:
If a is an assignment, x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct variables, and d1, . . . , dn
are objects such that di ∈ Dα if xi is of type α, then a[d1/x1, . . . , dn/xn] is the
assignment a′ defined by letting a′(xi) = di and a
′(y) = a(y), if y /∈ {x1, . . . , xn}.
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When working with hierarchies of relations it is often expedient to have a way
of interpreting relations as certain functions. The following definition provides
one (compare Muskens [39]).
Definition 11. Let R be an n-ary relation (n > 0) and let 0 < k ≤ n. Define
the k-th slice function F kR(d) of R by:
F kR(d) = {〈d1, . . . , dk−1, dk+1, . . . , dn〉 | 〈d1, . . . , dk−1, d, dk+1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R}
So F kR(d) is the n − 1-ary relation that is obtained from R by fixing its k-
th argument place by d. Note that if R is a relation in P(Ds × Dα1 × · · · ×
Dαn) its first slice function is a function from possible worlds to relations in
P(Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn) and can therefore be identified with what Montague would
call a relation-in-intension. This motivated the choice of letting D〈α1...αn〉 equal
P(Ds ×Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn) in definition 10.
The next definition provides terms with values in standard models. Clauses
(i) and (iv)–(viii) will probably not surprise the reader, as they are essentially
standard; for clauses (ii) and (iii) second slice functions provide motivation. For
(ii) lets V (a,AB) be equal to the result of applying the second slice function of
V (a,A) to V (a,B), while (iii) defines V (a, λxβ .A) as the relation whose second
slice function is the function F such that, for all d ∈ Dβ, F (d) = V (a[d/x], A).
Definition 12. The value VM (a,A) of a term A on a standard model M =
〈D, J〉 under an assignment a to M is defined as follows (we drop subscripts
M):
(i) V (a, c) = J(c) if c is a constant; V (a, x) = a(x) if x is a variable;
(ii) V (a,AB) = {〈w, ~d〉 | 〈w, V (a,B), ~d〉 ∈ V (a,A)};
(iii) V (a, λxβ .A) = {〈w, d, ~d〉 | d ∈ Dβ and 〈w, ~d〉 ∈ V (a[d/x], A)};
(iv) V (a,⊥) = ∅;
(v) V (a, ϕ→ ψ) = Ds − (V (a, ϕ)− V (a, ψ));




(vii) V (a, 〈R〉ϕ) = {w | ∃w′ ∈ V (a, ϕ) such that 〈w,w′〉 ∈ V (a,R)};
(viii) V (a,R`) = {〈w,w′〉 | 〈w′, w〉 ∈ V (a,R)}.
4.3 Intensional Models
Intensional models generalize the standard models just given in two ways. The
first generalization follows Henkin [28] in not necessarily associating domains
D〈α1...αn〉 with the full powerset P(Ds×Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn), but to be contented
with some subset of this relational space. When this generalization is made it
becomes possible to prove (generalized) completeness for the logic. However, if
a tableau system is used it will contain a Cut rule. In order to avoid invoking
the latter it seems to be necessary to adopt a second generalization and to move
to a class of structures that do not necessarily validate the axiom of Extension-
ality, which says that two predicates are identical when they can be predicated
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of the same objects. The strategy of taking out Extensionality, pioneered by
Takahashi [49] and Prawitz [45], allows one to prove the completeness of a cut-
free system, after which Extensionality can be added to the logic again if that
should be desired.
In the present set-up, which is inspired by Fitting [19], we will get rid of
Extensionality by distinguishing between the intension and the extension of
a term of complex type. The basic idea will be that any object in a domain
Dα can be the intension of some term. Intensions of complex type will not be
constructed set-theoretically out of those of a less complex type. Extensions, on
the other hand, will be relations over the relevant domains of intensions, with
their identity criteria therefore given by set membership. One and the same
extension may be determined by two or more different intensions.
Let us see how this can be done. A collection of domains will be a set of
non-empty sets {Dα | α ∈ T }, such that Dα ∩Dβ = ∅ if α 6= β. There are no
further constraints on collections of domains. Assignments and the notational
conventions pertaining to assignments are defined as before. The set of all as-
signments for a collection of domains D is denoted AD . The intension functions
defined below send terms to almost arbitrary domain elements. There are a few
restrictions on these functions but they are rather liberal.
Definition 13. An intension function for a collection of domains D = {Dα |
α ∈ T } and a language L is a function I with domain AD × T
L such that
(i) I(a,A) ∈ Dα, if A is of type α
(ii) I(a, x) = a(x), if x is a variable
(iii) I(a,A) = I(a′, A), if a and a′ agree on all variables free in A
(iv) I(a,A{x := B}) = I(a[I(a,B)/x], A), if B is free for x in A
Before we continue with also defining extension functions, let us pay some at-
tention to the nitty-gritty and observe that the intension functions just defined
behave well when the language is restricted or extended. The following property
will be used a couple of times below.
Proposition 1. (i) Let I be an intension function for D and L and let L′ ⊆ L.
Then the restriction I ′ of I to AD × T
L′ is an intension function for D and
L′. (ii) Let I be an intension function for D and L, let L ⊆ L′ and let f be a
function with domain L′\L such that f(c) ∈ Dα if c ∈ L
′
α\Lα. Then there is
an intension function I ′ for D and L′ such that I and I ′ agree on AD×T
L and
I ′(a, c) = f(c) for every c ∈ L′\L.
Proof. (i) is trivial, so let us verify (ii). Let A be an arbitrary term in T L
′
and
let c1, . . . , cn be the constants occurring in A that are in L
′ but not in L such
that ci <L′ cj if i < j. Let A
† be the result of replacing each ci in A with the
first variable xi in <V such that xi is not free in A, has the type of ci and is
distinct from each of the xj (j < i). Clearly A = A
†{x1 := c1, . . . , xn := cn}.
Let I ′(a,A) = I(a[f(c1)/x1, . . . , f(cn)/xn], A
†) and check that I ′ meets the
requirements.
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The next definition provides the promised extension functions, which send ob-
jects of complex type to certain relations. We first give very general constraints;
more requirements will follow in definition 16.
Definition 14. An extension function for D = {Dα | α ∈ T } is a function E
with domain ∪{Dα | α is complex} such that E(d) ⊆ Ds ×Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn if
d ∈ D〈α1...αn〉.
Note that there is no requirement that the restriction of an extension function to
anyD〈α1...αn〉 should be onto P(Ds×Dα1×· · ·×Dαn) or that extension functions
should be injective. This reflects the two generalizations discussed above. The
possible lack of surjectivity is Henkin’s generalization and the possible lack of
injectivity reflects the move that Prawitz and Takahashi made.
Definition 15. A generalized frame for the language L is a triple 〈D, I, E〉
such that D is a collection of domains, I is an intension function for D and L,
and E is an extension function for D.
We are interested in the extensions E(I(a,A)) of terms A. For the sake of read-
ability we will often write V (a,A) for these, letting V denote the composition
of E and I . The following definition puts a series of constraints on extension
functions that make things start to behave in a desired way.
Definition 16. A generalized frame 〈D, I, E〉 for L is a intensional model for
L if
(i) V (a,AB) = {〈w, ~d〉 | 〈w, I(a,B), ~d〉 ∈ V (a,A)};
(ii) V (a, λxβ .A) = {〈w, d, ~d〉 | d ∈ Dβ and 〈w, ~d〉 ∈ V (a[d/x], A)};
(iii) V (a,⊥) = ∅;
(iv) V (a, ϕ→ ψ) = Ds − (V (a, ϕ)− V (a, ψ));




(vi) V (a, 〈R〉ϕ) = {w | ∃w′ ∈ V (a, ϕ) such that 〈w,w′〉 ∈ V (a,R)};
(vii) V (a,R`) = {〈w,w′〉 | 〈w′, w〉 ∈ V (a,R)}.
The clauses here are identical to the relevant ones in definition 12, with one
important exception: in the clause for AB the (second slice function of) the
value of A is no longer applied to the extension of B, but to its intension. The
idea is that the extension of a predicate A determines and is determined by
all the things that A can truthfully be predicated of while the intension of A
determines and is determined by all the predicates that hold of A.
Do intensional models exist? One answer is that the standard models de-
fined in the previous section obviously correspond to a subclass of the class of
intensional models in which E is the identity function, but one would like to
see intensional models that are not standard. For the latter we refer to the
construction in the section on elementary model theory below.
Having the notion of intensional model in place we can define what it means
for a sentence to be made true by an intensional model in a given world or to
be valid in an intensional model.
18
Definition 17. Let M = 〈D, I, E〉 be an intensional model for L, let w ∈ Ds
and let ϕ be a sentence of L. M and w satisfy ϕ (or make ϕ true), M,w |= ϕ, if
w ∈ V (a, ϕ) for any a. We also say that M satisfies ϕ if there is some w ∈ Ds
such that M,w |= ϕ and that ϕ is satisfiable if some M satisfies ϕ. If M,w |= ϕ
for all w ∈ Ds then ϕ is said to be valid in M and we write M |= ϕ.
The corresponding notion of entailment is defined as follows.
Definition 18. Let Π and Σ be sets of sentences in L. Π is said to intensionally
entail or i-entail Σ, Π |=i Σ, if, for every intensional model M = 〈D, I, E〉 for
L and every w ∈ Ds, if M,w |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Π then M,w |= ϕ for some ϕ ∈ Σ.
This gives a rather weak logic in comparison with other type logics. In applica-
tions it will usually be necessary to strengthen the logic with sets of sentences
S which may typically contain modal axioms, but may also contain classical ax-
ioms, such as instantiations of the Extensionality scheme, the Axiom of Descrip-
tions, or axioms regulating λ-conversion. About the latter notion the following
proposition lists some useful facts.
Proposition 2. Let M = 〈D, I, E〉 be an intensional model, and let a be an
assignment for D. Then, for all A and B of appropriate types,
(i) V (a, λx.A) = V (a, λy.A{x := y}), if y is free for x in A;
(ii) V (a, (λx.A)B) = V (a,A{x := B}), if B is free for x in A;
(iii) V (a, λx.Ax) = V (a,A), if x is not free in A.
Proof. Left to the reader.
These statements show that λ-conversion preserves identity of extension, but
that does not imply that intensional identity is also preserved and that V can be
replaced uniformly with I in the proposition above. If such intensional identities
are wanted, and in most applications one will certainly want to have at least
the possibility of α and β conversion in any context, an axiomatic extension of
the logic may provide them. See 5.2 below.
5 Tableaus for Modal Type Theory
5.1 Tableaus
In this section the proof theory of MTT will be given in the form of a tableau
system. The calculus will be set up as a form of labeled deduction, with labels
storing information about worlds and truth values. Formally, a labeled sentence
of L will be a triple 〈S, u, ϕ〉 consisting of a sign S, which can either be T or
F, a constant u ∈ Ls, and a sentence ϕ of L. Labeled sentences 〈S, u, ϕ〉 will
typically be written as Su:ϕ, where Tu:ϕ can be read as ‘ϕ is true in world u’
and Fu:ϕ as expressing that ϕ is false in u.
Tableaus will be defined as certain sets of branches. A branch in its turn



























Γ, Fu:ϕ{x := c}







(u′ not in the premise)
Table 1: Tableau rules for MTT.
extended from sentences to labeled sentences and branches, for we can define an
intensional model M = 〈D, I, E〉 to satisfy Tu:ϕ if I(a, u) ∈ V (a, ϕ) for some
(and hence every) a, while letting M satisfy Fu:ϕ if I(a, u) /∈ V (a, ϕ) for any a.
M is said to satisfy a branch Γ if it satisfies all ϑ ∈ Γ. If no model M satisfies
Γ, Γ is said to be unsatisfiable; otherwise Γ is satisfiable.
We will use the usual sequent notation for branches, writing Γ, θ for Γ∪{θ},
etc. Diverging slightly from the usual set-up of tableaus, tableau rules will be
defined as certain relations between branches, not as relations between labeled
sentences. The interpretation of these rules (that are given in Table 1) is one
of replacement of branches, for example the interpretation of T→ in Table 1 is
that the branch Γ,Tu:ϕ→ ψ can be replaced by the two branches Γ,Fu:ϕ and
Γ,Tu:ψ in any tableau. The format also allows the formulation of a weakening
rule W that allows the removal of signed formulas from a branch.




meaning that whenever a branch is found to contain Tu: ϕ → ψ it may be
split, Fu:ϕ may be added to one side and Tu:ψ to another. Of course the two
approaches very much boil down to the same thing. The present set-up is close
to that of a Gentzen calculus for the logic: read T as ‘left’ and F as ‘right’ and
turn the rules in Table 1 upside down.
A convention that is adopted in Table 1 (and that we shall continue to use)
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Table 2: Derived tableau rules and Cut (abbreviated forms).
An alternative notation for tableau rules, better suited for inline environments,
is Γ/Γ1; . . . ; Γn, where / replaces the horizontal line and ; the vertical lines in
any rule. The following definition tells how we can expand sets of branches and
obtain tableaus.
Definition 19. A set of branches T ′ is a one step expansion of a set of branches
T if T ′ = (T\Γ) ∪ {Γ1, . . . ,Γn} for some tableau rule Γ/Γ1; . . . ; Γn. T
′ is an
expansion of T if there is a sequence T1, . . . , Tn such that T1 = T , Tn = T
′ and
each Tk+1 is a one step expansion of Tk. A set of branches T is a tableau if it
is an expansion of {Γ} for some finite branch Γ.
Thus while no finiteness condition was imposed on branches per se, tableaus are
stipulated to originate from finite branches. Note that the T⊥ and Ax rules can
cause branches to disappear from a tableau while it is being expanded. This
can lead to the closure of tableaus as defined in the following definition.
Definition 20. A finite branch Γ has a closed tableau if ∅ is an expansion
of {Γ}. If Π and Σ are sets of sentences then Π ` Σ holds if, for some finite
Π0 ⊆ Π, some finite Σ0 ⊆ Σ and some u ∈ Ls that does not occur in any
sentence in Π0 ∪ Σ0, {Tu:ϕ | ϕ ∈ Π0} ∪ {Fu:ϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ0} has a closed tableau.
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Name Modal axiom Corresponding R rule
T∀ ∀p([R]p→ p) /Tu:Ru
D∀ ∀p([R]p→ 〈R〉p) /Tu1:Ru2 (u2 fresh)
4∀ ∀p([R]p→ [R][R]p) Tu1:Ru2,Tu2:Ru3/Tu1:Ru3
5∀ ∀p(〈R〉p→ [R]〈R〉p) Tu1:Ru2,Tu1:Ru3/Tu2:Ru3
Table 3: Correspondences between modal axioms and certain rules.
We employ the usual notational conventions with respect to `. A formula ϕ
is called tableau provable if `ϕ.
For ease of reference Table 2 lists some rules that are derivable from those
already given in Table 1. We leave it to the reader to show that these rules
are indeed derivable (most cases are entirely trivial, some easy but amusing).
Another exercise is to show that ` ∃p(p ∧ ∀q(q → [R](p → q))). Table 2 also
displays the Cut rule, which we will see is admissable. Here we have not bothered
to write all the Γs of our official rule presentation and have reverted to the more
usual way of presenting tableau rules.
Clearly the rules were chosen in a way that makes it possible to show Sound-
ness to hold.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). If Γ has a closed tableau then Γ is unsatisfiable.
Hence Π ` Σ implies Π |=i Σ.
Proof. For each tableau rule Γ/Γ1; . . . ; Γn, if Γ is satisfiable, one of the Γi is
satisfiable. Verifying this will involve proposition 1 for some cases. By induction,
if T is an expansion of {Γ} then, if Γ is satisfiable, some Γ′ ∈ T must be
satisfiable. Hence if Γ has a closed tableau, Γ can not be satisfiable. This
proves the first statement of the theorem. Suppose Π ` Σ. Then for some finite
Π0 ⊆ Π and Σ0 ⊆ Σ and some u ∈ Ls that does not occur in Π0 ∪ Σ0, {Tu:ϕ |
ϕ ∈ Π0} ∪ {Fu:ϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ0)} has a closed tableau and hence is unsatisfiable. It
follows that Π |=i Σ
5.2 Axiomatic Extensions
If, in some setting, one wants to restrict attention to a class of models that
validate some set of sentences S then it becomes natural to define Π |=S Σ as
S ∪ Π |=i Σ. Similarly, Π `S Σ can be defined as S ∪ Π ` Σ and the soundness
theorem gives that Π `S Σ implies Π |=S Σ (while completeness, yet to be
shown to hold, gives the converse). Prime candidates for inclusion in such a
theory S are the usual rules for lambda conversion. These are the universal
closures of any instantiation of one of the following schemes.
(α) λx.A = λy.A{x := y}, if y is free for x in A;




























Figure 1: Derivation of Tu1:Ru2,Tu2:Ru3/Tu1:Ru3 from 4∀
(η) λx.Ax = A, if x is not free in A.
It is clearly consistent to add these rules to MTT, as they are valid in standard




if A =βη B
also becomes a derived rule. Since one can work with the standard notion of
reduction βη here, it is clear that the resulting logic is Church-Rosser. This
will also hold if, for some reason, it is decided that S should contain (α), but
only one of the rules (β) and (η). Note that the (β) rule scheme discussed here
should well be distinguished from the rule we have called β-ext, which is much
weaker, as it only allows β-conversions in head position.
Other obvious candidates for inclusion in a theory S are the usual modal
axioms for modalities 〈R〉. For instance, one could ensure validity of T by
including the scheme ([R]ϕ→ ϕ) (the leading  ensures that one gets validity,
not just truth of T in the initial world). Another way to express the same
idea, more natural perhaps in the present context, is by quantification over
propositions, as in ∀p([R]p → p), which is called T∀ in Table 3, where also
quantified analogues of D, 4 and 5 are found. If such axioms are adopted it is
often possible to use derived rules in one’s tableaus that closely mirror the usual
frame correspondences in modal logic (for the latter see e.g. chapter 1 of this
handbook, by Blackburn and Van Benthem). In fig. 1, for example, is a tableau
verifying that Tu1:Ru2,Tu2:Ru3/Tu1:Ru3 is a derived rule in the presence of
the 4∀ axiom. On the other hand, if Tu1:Ru2,Tu2:Ru3/Tu1:Ru3 should be
adopted as an additional rule, ∀p[R]p→ [R][R]p becomes tableau provable, as
fig. 2 shows. Table 3 lists some more of these correspondences (use a nominal
u̇3 when showing the correctness of the last one) and the reader will have no
















Figure 2: Derivation of 4∀ in the presence of Tu1:Ru2,Tu2:Ru3/Tu1:Ru3
also possible to directly express properties of accessibility relations, even those
that are not modally definable in the usual set-up. For example, irreflexivity
of R can be expressed as ∀xs(ẋ → ¬〈R〉ẋ). See Blackburn et al. [10] for
more information on expressing first order relational properties with the help of
nominals.
6 Elementary Model Theory
In this section we will prove some basic modeltheoretic properties of MTT:
Generalized Completeness, the Generalized Löwenheim-Skolem property, and
the admissability of the Cut rule, all via a Model Existence theorem in the way
Smullyan [48] did it for first order logic (see also Fitting [17, 19]). None of the
techniques employed here is new, but we include full proofs for two reasons. The
first of these being that, since our definition of an intensional model deviates
from existing notions in the literature and since the devil is always in the details,
it is good to have an explicit sanity check on those definitions. The second reason
is that readers not already familiar with these kind of proofs may find examples
here in a relatively streamlined setting.
Before we tackle the main modeltheoretic properties of MTT, some atten-
tion must be paid to the notion of identity in intensional models, as this relation
may not be the identity of the metalanguage.
6.1 Identity and Indiscernability
The decision to let the relations =〈αα〉 be abbreviations of λxαλyα∀z〈α〉(zx →
zy), as it was done in definition 9, derives directly from Russell, and via Russell
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from Leibniz, as the abbreviation equates identity with indistinguishability. It
is clear that in standard models identity and indistinguishability coincide, but,
as was noted by Andrews [2] for the non-modal case, in nonstandard models it
may happen that two objects d1 and d2 that are in fact not identical may fail to
be distinguished because there simply is no set to keep them apart. This may
be thought of as an anomaly and one may be tempted to restrict attention to
intensional models that are normal in the following sense.
Definition 21. An intensional model M = 〈D, I, E〉 is normal if, for any α,
any d, d′ ∈ Dα and arbitrary a, d = d
′ if 〈w, d, d′〉 ∈ V (a,=) for some w ∈ Ds.
In fact restriction to normal models will not buy us any new truths as will be
shown shortly. First some facts that will come in handy.
Proposition 4. Let M = 〈D, I, E〉 be an intensional model, and let a be an
assignment for D. Then, for all A, B and B′ of appropriate types,
(i) V (a,A = B) = ∅ or V (a,A = B) = Ds;
(ii) V (a,A = A) = Ds;
(iii) V (a,A{x := B} = A{x := B′}) = Ds if V (a,B = B
′) = Ds, provided B
and B′ are free for x in A.
Proof. (i) Suppose w ∈ V (a,Aα = Bα), i.e. w ∈ V (a, ∀x(xA → xB)). Choosing
λyα.∀z〈α〉(zA → zy) for x, it is easily shown that w ∈ V (a,∀z(zA → zB)).
Hence w′ ∈ V (a, ∀x(xA → xB)) for all w′ ∈ Ds and we are done. (ii) Trivial.
(iii) Assume that w ∈ V (a,B = B′, i.e. w ∈ V (a, ∀y(yB → yB′)). Choose
λv.A{x := B} = A{x := v} (with fresh v) for y and derive that w ∈ V (a,A{x :=
B} = A{x := B′}).
The following proposition shows that, if desired, one can always ‘normalize’
models by ‘dividing out’ the indistinguishability relation. The proof implicitly
uses the axiom of choice.
Proposition 5. Let M = 〈D, I, E〉 be an intensional model and let w ∈ Ds.
There are a normal intensional model M = 〈D, I, E〉 and a w ∈ Ds such that,
for each sentence ϕ, w satisfies ϕ in M iff w satisfies ϕ in M .
Proof. Suppose M = 〈D, I, E〉. We define the relation ∼ between objects of
identical type inM ’s domains as follows. For any α, any d, d′ ∈ Dα and arbitrary
a let d ∼ d′ iff, for some (and therefore every) w ∈ Ds, 〈w, d, d
′〉 ∈ V (a,=〈αα〉).
Clearly, ∼ is an equivalence relation. Using proposition 4 and definition 13 it is
straightforward to show that, for any term A,
(16) d ∼ d′ =⇒ I(a[d/x], A) ∼ I(a[d′/x], A) .
It is also worth noting that, for any w, w′ and any ϕ and a
(17) w ∼ w′ =⇒ (w ∈ V (a, ϕ) =⇒ w′ ∈ V (a, ϕ)) .
The way to show this is to observe that, if neither xs nor ys is free in ϕ,
25
(18) V (a[w/x], (λy.ϕ)` x) = Ds ⇐⇒ w ∈ V (a, ϕ) ,
and to then use the definition of w ∼ w′.
Define d = {d′ | d ∼ d′}, and let Dα = {d | d ∈ Dα}, while D = {Dα | α ∈
T }. Let f be a function such that f(d) ∈ d, if d ∈ Dα. For any assignment a
for D, let a◦ be the assignment for D defined by a◦(x) = f(a(x)), for all x. Let
I(a,A) = I(a◦, A), for each assignment a for D and each term A. Then I is an
intension function for D. The first three requirements of definition 13 are easily
checked, so let us check the last requirement. Note that
I(a◦, A{x := B}) = (by definition 13)
I(a◦[I(a◦, B)/x], A) ∼ (by (16))
I(a◦[f(I(a◦, B))/x]), A) = (by the definition of I)
I(a◦[f(I(a,B))/x]), A) = (by the definition of ◦)
I((a[I(a,B)/x])◦, A) .
From this conclude that I(a,A{x := B}) = I(a[I(a,B)/x], A).
Define E by letting E(dα) = {〈w, d1, . . . , dn〉 | 〈w, d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ E(d)}, if
α is complex. In order to show that this is well-defined assume that w ∼ w′,
d ∼ d′, and di ∼ d
′
i. Then, if R, x1, . . . , xn are distinct variables of appropriate
types
〈w, d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ E(d) ⇐⇒ (by def. (16))
w ∈ V (a[d/R, d1/x1, . . . , dn/xn], Rx1 . . . xn) ⇐⇒ (by (17))
w′ ∈ V (a[d/R, d1/x1, . . . , dn/xn], Rx1 . . . xn) ⇐⇒ (equational reas.)
w′ ∈ V (a[d′/R, d′1/x1, . . . , d
′
n/xn], Rx1 . . . xn) ⇐⇒ (by def. (16))




so that the definition was legitimate.
Write V (a,A) for E(I(a,A)) and observe that
(19) 〈w, d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ V (a,A) iff 〈w, d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ V (a
◦, A)
From this it follows by a straightforward induction on term complexity that
M = 〈D, I, E〉 is a intensional model. It also follows that w satisfies ϕ in M iff
w satisfies ϕ in M and that M is normal.
So the notion of identity of the logic may diverge from the notion of identity
employed in the metalanguage, but for notions like satisfiability and entailment
this does not matter.
6.2 Model Existence
We now come to the Model Existence theorem and its proof. This theorem
(Theorem 7 below) roughly says that if a branch Γ does not have a certain kind
of property, here called a ‘sound unsatisfiability property’, it is satisfiable by an
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intensional model. The proof proceeds in two steps. One step shows that such a
branch Γ can be extended to a branch Γ∗ that is downward saturated in a sense
to be defined shortly. The other step shows that downward saturated branches
are satisfiable. We will prove the last of these two statements first. Let us start
with the definition of a downward saturated branch.
Definition 22. A branch Γ of L is called downward saturated if the following
hold:
(a) {Tu:ϕ, Fu:ϕ} 6⊆ Γ for any sentence ϕ and constant u;
(b) Tu:⊥ /∈ Γ;
(c) Su: (λx.A)B ~C ∈ Γ =⇒ Su:A{x := B} ~C ∈ Γ, if λx.A, B, and the sequence
of terms ~C are closed and of appropriate types;
(d) Tu:ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ =⇒ Fu:ϕ ∈ Γ or Tu:ψ ∈ Γ;
(e) Fu:ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ =⇒ {Tu:ϕ, Fu:ψ} ⊆ Γ;
(f) Tu: ∀xαϕ ∈ Γ =⇒ Tu:ϕ{x := A} ∈ Γ for all closed A of type α;
(g) Fu: ∀xαϕ ∈ Γ =⇒ Fu:ϕ{x := c} ∈ Γ for some c ∈ Lα
(h) Tu: 〈R〉ϕ ∈ Γ =⇒ {Tu:Ru′,Tu′ : ϕ} ⊆ Γ for some u′ ∈ Ls;
(i) Fu: 〈R〉ϕ ∈ Γ =⇒ Fu : Ru′ ∈ Γ or Fu′ : ϕ ∈ Γ for all u′ ∈ Ls;
(j) Su:R`u′ ∈ Γ =⇒ Su′ : Ru ∈ Γ;
A downward saturated branch Γ of L is said to be complete if Tu:ϕ ∈ Γ or
Fu:ϕ ∈ Γ for each sentence ϕ of L and each u ∈ Ls.
That downward saturated branches are satisfiable is the content of the next
lemma. Here an intensional model is constructed using the method employed
by Takahashi and Prawitz.
Lemma 6 (Hintikka Lemma). If Γ is a downward saturated branch in a
language L such that Lα 6= ∅ for each basic type α then Γ is satisfied by a
intensional model. If Γ is complete, then Γ is satisfied by a normal countable
intensional model.
Proof. Let Γ be a downward saturated branch in a language L as indicated.
We will find an intensional model satisfying Γ using the Takahashi-Prawitz
construction. The following induction on type complexity defines domains Dα
as sets of pairs 〈A, e〉, where A is a closed term of type α and e is called a
possible extension of A.
(i) If α is basic let Dα = {〈c, c〉 | c ∈ Lα};
(ii) If α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉 let 〈Aα, e〉 ∈ Dα iff A is closed, e ⊆ Ds×Dα1×· · ·×Dαn
and, whenever 〈B1, e1〉 ∈ Dα1 , . . . , 〈Bn, en〉 ∈ Dαn
(a) If Tu:AB1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ then 〈〈u, u〉, 〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ e;
(b) If Fu:AB1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ then 〈〈u, u〉, 〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 /∈ e.
Each Dα is non-empty. For basic types α this follows from the requirement that
Lα 6= ∅; for complex types 〈α1 . . . αn〉 consider 〈λxα1 . . . λxαn .⊥,∅〉. Since
induction on term complexity easily shows that terms have unique types, we
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also have that Dα ∩ Dβ = ∅ if α 6= β. Hence {Dα | α ∈ T } is a collection of
domains. It is worth observing that each Dα is a function if Γ is complete. In
that case each Dα will be countable.
The setD = {Dα | α ∈ T } will be the collection of domains of the intensional
model we are after. We will define a function I which will turn out to be an
intension function for D. First some handy notation. If π is an ordered pair,
write π1 and π2 for the first and second elements of π respectively, so that
π = 〈π1, π2〉. If f is a function whose values are ordered pairs, write f 1 and
f2 for the functions with the same domain as f , such that f 1(z) = (f(z))1
and f2(z) = (f(z))2 for any argument z. Let a be an assignment for D. The
substitution ←−a is defined by ←−a (x) = a1(x) and we let I1(a,A) = A←−a for any
term A. The second component of I is defined using an induction on term
complexity.
(a) I2(a, x) = a2(x), if x is a variable;
I2(a, cα) = c, if α is basic;
I2(a, cα) = {〈〈u, u〉, 〈A1, e1〉, . . . , 〈An, en〉〉 | 〈Ai, ei〉 ∈ Dαi
& Tu: cA1 . . . An ∈ Γ}, if α is complex;
(b) I2(a,AB) = {〈w, ~d〉 | 〈w, I(a,B), ~d〉 ∈ I2(a,A)};
(c) I2(a, λxβ .A) = {〈w, d, ~d〉 | d ∈ Dβ and 〈w, ~d〉 ∈ I
2(a[d/x], A)};
(d) I2(a,⊥) = ∅;
(e) I2(a, ϕ→ ψ) = Ds − (I
2(a, ϕ)− I2(a, ψ));




(g) I2(a, 〈R〉ϕ) = {w | ∃w′ with 〈w,w′〉 ∈ I2(a,R) and w′ ∈ I2(a, ϕ)};
(h) I2(a,R`) = {〈w,w′〉 | 〈w′, w〉 ∈ I2(a,R)}.
The definition obviously follows definition 16 save in its first clause. Note that
well-definedness does not depend on the question whether I is an intension
function for D and L, and indeed the latter is not immediately obvious. We
need to check the requirements in definition 13. That I(a, x) = a(x) for any
variable x is immediate and that I(a,A) = I(a′, A) if a and a′ agree on the
variables free in A follows by a standard property of substitutions and an easy
induction. Suppose that B is free for x in A. Then
I1(a,A{x := B}) = A{x := B}←−a = A←−a [x := B←−a ] =
A←−a [x := I1(a,B)] = A
←−−−−−−−−
a[I(a,B)/x] = I1(a[I(a,B)/x], A) .
That I2(a,A{x := B}) = I2(a[I(a,B)/x], A) follows by a straightforward in-
duction on the complexity of A which we leave to the reader. It follows that
I(a,A{x := B}) = I(a[I(a,B)/x], A) if B is free for x in A.
It remains to be shown that I(a,A) ∈ Dα for any assignment a and term A of
type α. This is done by induction on the complexity of A. That I(a, xα) ∈ Dα
if x is a variable follows from the stipulation that I(a, x) = a(x) and that
I(a, cα) ∈ Dα if α is basic is immediate. In the remaining cases the type of
A is complex. Since it is easily seen by a separate induction that I2(a,Aα) ⊆
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Ds × Dα1 × · · · × Dαn if α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉, it suffices to prove that, whenever
α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉, and 〈B1, e1〉 ∈ Dα1 , . . . , 〈Bn, en〉 ∈ Dαn
(a) If Tu:A←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ then 〈〈u, u〉, 〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ I
2(a,A);
(b) If Fu:A←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ then 〈〈u, u〉, 〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 /∈ I
2(a,A).
We will consider some remaining cases of the induction, leaving others to the
reader. IH will be short for ‘induction hypothesis’.
• Aα ≡ c and α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉. The requirement follows from the definition
of I2(a, c) and clause (i) of definition 22.
• A ≡ B〈βα1...αn〉Cβ . Suppose 〈B1, e1〉 ∈ Dα1 , . . . , 〈Bn, en〉 ∈ Dαn . From
the induction hypothesis it follows that I(a, C) = 〈C←−a , I2(a, C)〉 ∈ Dβ .
Hence
Tu: (BC)←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ ⇐⇒
Tu:B←−a C←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ =⇒ (IH)
〈〈u, u〉, I(a, C), 〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ I
2(a,B) ⇐⇒ (def. of I)
〈〈u, u〉, 〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ I
2(a,BC)
This proves the (a) part of the case; the (b) part is similar.
• A ≡ (λxα1C〈α2...αn〉). Again suppose di = 〈Bi, ei〉 ∈ Dαi , and reason as
follows.
Fu: (λx.C)←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ ⇐⇒
Fu: (λx.C←−a [x := x])B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ =⇒ def. 22, B1 is closed
Fu:C←−a [x := B1]B2 . . . Bn ∈ Γ ⇐⇒
Fu:C
←−−−−
a[d1/x]B2 . . . Bn ∈ Γ =⇒ (IH)
〈〈u, u〉, d2, . . . , dn〉 /∈ I
2(a[d1/x], C) ⇐⇒ (def. of I
2)
〈〈u, u〉, d1, d2, . . . , dn〉 /∈ I
2(a, λx.C)
This proves the (b) part, which is similar to the (a) part.
• A〈〉 ≡ ∀xβϕ. Let d ∈ Dβ be arbitrary. Then d = 〈B, e〉 for some closed
term B. In order to prove the (a) part of the statement we reason as
follows.
Tu: (∀xϕ)←−a ∈ Γ ⇐⇒
Tu:∀xϕ←−a [x := x] ∈ Γ =⇒ def. 22
Tu:ϕ←−a [x := x]{x := B} ∈ Γ ⇐⇒
Tu:ϕ
←−−−−
a[d/x] ∈ Γ =⇒ (IH)
〈u, u〉 ∈ I2(a[d/x], ϕ)
Since d was arbitrary, we conclude that 〈u, u〉 ∈ I2(a, ∀xϕ). The (b) part
is similar.
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• The cases A〈〉 ≡ ⊥, A〈〉 ≡ ϕ → ψ, A〈〉 ≡ 〈R〉ϕ and A〈s〉 ≡ R
` are
straightforward.
This concludes the proof that I is an intension function for D and L. Now
define the function E by letting E(〈A, e〉) = e if 〈A, e〉 ∈ Dα for any complex
α. Clearly, E(I(a,A)) = I2(a,A) for any A, E is an extension function for D,
and M = 〈D, I, E〉 is an intensional model for the language L. It is easy to see
that M satisfies Γ.
In order to prove the second part of the lemma, assume that Γ is complete.
We have already established that M is countable in that case, and proposition
5 gives a normal countable intensional model satisfying Γ.
We now come to the first step sketched in the introduction to this section.
The notion of an unsatisfiability property (related to the abstract consistency
properties of Smullyan [48] and Fitting [17]) is defined and it is shown that
branches that do not have a ‘sound’ unsatisfiability property can in fact be
extended to a downward saturated branch and hence are satisfiable. The interest
in the theorem comes from the fact that many interesting notions can in fact
be related to sound unsatisfiability properties as we shall see below.
Definition 23. Let U be a set of branches in the language L. U is an unsatis-
fiability property in L if, for each tableau rule Γ/Γ1; . . . ; Γn, {Γ1, . . . ,Γn} ⊆ U
implies Γ ∈ U .
An unsatisfiability property U in L is sound if no Γ ∈ U is satisfied by an
intensional model for L.
Theorem 7 (Model Existence). Let L and C be languages such that each Cα
is denumerably infinite and L∩C = ∅. Assume that U is a sound unsatisfiability
property in L ∪ C and that Γ is a branch in the language L. If Γ /∈ U then Γ is
satisfied by a countable normal intensional model.
Proof. Let U and Γ be as described. We construct a downward saturated branch
Γ∗ such that Γ ⊆ Γ∗. Let ϑ1, . . . , ϑn, . . . be an enumeration of all labeled
sentences in L∪C. Write #(ϑ) for the index that the labeled sentence ϑ obtains
in this enumeration. Let Γ0 = Γ and define each Γn+1 by distinguishing the
following four cases.
• Γn+1 = Γn, if Γn ∪ {ϑn} ∈ U ;
• Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {ϑn}, if Γn ∪ {ϑn} /∈ U and ϑn is not of the form Fu: ∀xϕ or
of the form Tu: 〈R〉ϕ;
• Γn+1 = Γn ∪{ϑn,Fu:ϕ{x := c}}, where c is the first constant in Cα which
does not occur in Γn ∪ {ϑn}, if Γn ∪ {ϑn} /∈ U and ϑn ≡ Fu: ∀xαϕ;
• Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {ϑn,Tu:Ru
′,Tu′ : ϕ}, where u′ is the first constant in Cs
which does not occur in Γn ∪ {ϑn}, if Γn ∪ {ϑn} /∈ U and ϑn ≡ Tu: 〈R〉ϕ.
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This is well-defined since each Γn contains only a finite number of constants
from C. That Γn /∈ U for each n follows by a simple induction which uses
the definition of an unsatisfiability property and the fact that F∀ and T〈·〉 are
tableau rules. Define Γ∗ =
⋃
n Γn. For all finite sets {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} and all
k ≥ max{k1, . . . , kn}
(20) {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γ
∗ ⇔ Γk ∪ {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} /∈ U
In order to show this, let k ≥ max{k1, . . . , kn} and let {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γ
∗.
Then there is some ` such that {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γ`. Let m = max{k, `}.
We have that Γk ∪ {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γm. Since Γm /∈ U and U is closed under
supersets (because of the weakening rule W), it follows that Γk∪{ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} /∈
U . For the reverse direction, suppose that Γk ∪ {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} /∈ U . Then,
since U is closed under supersets, Γki ∪ {ϑki} /∈ U , for each of the ki. By the
construction of Γ∗ each ϑki ∈ Γ
∗ and {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γ
∗.
Γ∗ is a downward saturated branch. The conditions (g) and (h) of definition
22 immediately follow from the construction of Γ∗. For checking the other
conditions of definition 22 the equivalence in (20) can be used. Here we check
condition (i), which may serve as an example for the other cases. Assume
Fu: 〈R〉ϕ ∈ Γ∗ and let u′ be a constant of type s. Let k be the maximum of
#(Fu: 〈R〉ϕ), #(Fu:Ru′), and #(Fu′ : ϕ). Since, by (20), Γk ∪ {Fu: 〈R〉ϕ} /∈ U ,
it must be the case by definition 23 and the fact that F〈·〉 is a tableau rule that
either Γk ∪ {Fu:Ru
′} /∈ U or Γk ∪ {Fu
′ : ϕ} /∈ U . Using (20) again, we find that
either Fu:Ru′ ∈ Γ∗ or Fu′ : ϕ ∈ Γ∗.
We conclude that Γ∗ is satisfied by an intensional modelM . In order to prove
that there is a normal countable intensional model satisfying Γ∗ and hence Γ
it suffices to show that Γ∗ is complete. Let ϕ be any sentence of L ∪ C and
assume that Tu:ϕ /∈ Γ∗ and Fu:ϕ /∈ Γ∗. Then, by (20), Γk ∪ {Tu:ϕ} ∈ U and
Γk ∪{Fu:ϕ} ∈ U , for sufficiently large k. But M satisfies Γk and therefore must
either satisfy Γk ∪ {Tu:ϕ} or Γk ∪ {Fu:ϕ}, contradicting the soundness of U .
Thus Γ∗ is complete and some normal countable intensional model satisfies Γ∗
and Γ.
We can now reap a harvest of corollaries by relating various notions to unsatis-
fiability properties. In the following Γ will always be a branch in some language
L while ∆ ranges over branches in L∪C, where L and C are as in the formulation
of Theorem 7.
Corollary 8 (Generalized Compactness). If each finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ is satisfiable
then Γ is satisfiable.
Proof. {∆ | some finite ∆0 ⊆ ∆ is unsatisfiable} is a sound unsatisfiability
property.
Corollary 9 (Generalized Löwenheim–Skolem). If Γ is satisfiable then Γ
is satisfiable by a countable intensional model.
Proof. {∆ | ∆ is unsatisfiable} is a sound unsatisfiability property.
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Corollary 10 (Generalized Completeness). If Γ is unsatisfiable then Γ has
a closed tableau.
Proof. {∆ | ∆ has a closed tableau} is a sound unsatisfiability property.
Corollary 11 (Admissability of Cut). If Γ ∪ {Tu:ϕ} and Γ ∪ {Fu:ϕ} have
closed tableaus then Γ has a closed tableau.
Proof. Use soundness and generalized completeness.
7 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at some of the motivations for combining modality with
quantification and abstraction over objects of higher order. Montague’s logic
IL was reviewed and was found to have some shortcomings: it is not Church-
Rosser and it is not intensional in Whitehead and Russell’s original sense. An
alternative higher order modal logic MTT was then introduced. MTT imports
many ideas from the higher order logics in Fitting [19], but is based on a simpler
notion of model. We have dubbed the generalized models on which MTT is
based intensional models. As was shown above, the usual rules of α, β and η
conversion can consistently be added to the logic in which case the logic sports
the Church-Rosser property.
The logic is also fully intensional (or “hyperintensional”) in the sense that
co-entailing expressions need not be identical and we shall use the rest of this
conclusion to discuss some points that arise in relation with this. Consider (21–
24), where in each case a natural language sentence is accompanied by its MTT
rendering. (Here fido, fritz and mary are constants of individual type e, in is a
predicate of type 〈e〉, and know is a relation of type 〈〈〉e〉.)
(21) a. Fritz is out if Fido is in
b. in fido→ ¬(in fritz)
(22) a. Fido is out if Fritz is in
b. in fritz→ ¬(in fido)
(23) a. Mary knows Fritz is out if Fido is in
b. know (in fido→ ¬(in fritz)) mary
(24) a. Mary knows Fido is out if Fritz is in
b. know (in fritz→ ¬(in fido)) mary
Simple tableaus will verify that (21b) and (22b) co-entail, as they should. But
(23b) and (24b) do not co-entail: Note that {Tu: (23b),Fu: (24b)} is downward
saturated and thus will have an intensional model refuting one direction of the
entailment.
It may be protested that there is at least one sense in which Mary knows
that Fido is out if Fritz is in if she knows that Fritz is out if Fido is in: While
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she may have failed to derive the contraposed statement explicitly, there is still
a sense in which she is implicitly committed to it. Such a notion of implicit
knowledge is also available in MTT. Let K be a constant of type 〈es〉. K can
be given the role of an epistemic alternative relation by adopting the following
meaning postulate.
(25) ∀xe∀ws(Kxw ↔ ∀p〈〉(know px→ ♦(ẇ ∧ p)))
This says effectively that a world w is an epistemic alternative for a person x
if w is in the intersection of the extensions of all propositions that x explicitly
knows to hold.8 A tableau will show that (25) entails (26).
(26) ∀xe∀p〈〉(know px→ [Kx]p)
Thus it can be deduced that (27), where the modal operator [Kmary] was used
to model Mary’s implicit beliefs, follows from (23). In fact implicit beliefs are
closed under consequence and hence co-entailment.
(27) a. Mary implicitly knows Fido is out if Fritz is in
b. [Kmary](in fritz→ ¬(in fido))
The non-equivalence of (23b) and (24b) discussed above illustrates that MTT
is intensional in Whitehead and Russell’s sense of the term. Relations, including
zero-place relations, can be co-extensional without being identical. This means
that linguistic expressions that are assumed to denote relations are no longer
predicted to be intersubstitutable if they have the same extension, not even if
they have the same extension in all possible worlds.
This is not unimportant since many expressions in natural language are un-
doubtedly relational and a nasty foundational problem will no longer be associ-
ated with them, but there seems to be a rest category of problems with expres-
sions of basic type. Above we have treated proper names as having a basic type
e, and this leads to the well-known Hesperus–Phosphorus, or Cicero–Tully, kind
of problem. If Hesperus is translated as hesperuse, Phosphorus as phosphoruse,
and the identity statement Hesperus is Phosphorus as hesperus = phosphorus,
the consequence will be the false prediction that the two names can be substi-
tuted for one another in any context salva veritate.
There are two reactions to this. One possible reaction is an adaptation of
the logic. One could introduce some domain of individual concepts and allow
many-one correspondences between individual concepts and individuals. Such
a strategy is followed by Fox and Lappin [20] in a different set-up, but in our
case it would lead to a complication of the logic, be it probably a mild one.
The second reaction leaves the logic as is, but adapts the rendering of nat-
ural language expressions. If names can be treated as predicates in some way,
the intension–extension distinction will come for free for them as well. In fact,
the existing literature contains several proposals for treating names as based
8Note that the present set-up distinguishes between propositions (the elements of D〈〉)
and sets of possible worlds. The extension of a proposition will be a set of worlds. Different
propositions may determine the same extension.
33
on predicates and not on individual constants. Russell’s description theory of
names is an early example and Montague [38] offers another example by essen-
tially treating names as being of the “raised” type 〈〈e〉〉, not simply of type e.
In combination with a treatment of identity as co-extensionality (in all possible
worlds) this would avoid the problems if our logic is used. A third proposal
that in effect treats names as relations comes from the literature on plurality.
Many authors on this subject, starting with Bartsch [5] and Bennett [6] (see
Lønning [34] for an overview), have argued that both singular and plural indi-
viduals should in fact be treated as sets, with the semantic property of being a
singleton corresponding to the grammatical notion of singularity. In the present
set-up this effect can be obtained by redefining type e as a complex type 〈0〉,
where 0 is a new basic type for abstract individuals. Type 0 objects will now
correspond one-to-one with the extensions of those type e objects that have
singleton extensions, i.e. to singular individuals, but there are many intensional
models in which hesperuse and phosphoruse are co-extensional (with a singleton
extension) in all worlds but are not identical. Let Ae ≈ Be be an abbreviation
of ∀x0(Ax ↔ Bx), i.e. let A ≈ B express necessary co-extensionality, and
assume that natural language is (the “is of identity”) in fact expresses ≈. Then
the argument in (28) will be rendered as (29) and will therefore be predicted to
be invalid.
(28) Hesperus is Phosphorus Mary knows that Hesperus is Hesperus
Mary knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus
(29) hesperus ≈ phosphorus know (hesperus ≈ hesperus) mary
know (hesperus ≈ phosphorus) mary
Again, the invalidity of the argument depends on the fact that Mary’s knowledge
was taken to be Mary’s explicit knowledge. If implicit knowledge is taken, the
argument will turn out to be valid, as the reader will have no difficulty to verify.
We conclude that the logic MTT is truly intensional, as it will distinguish
between the meaning of one relation and another necessarily co-extensive with
it. This can be used to avoid many substitution problems in natural language
semantics and other areas. If it is moreover accepted that proper names should
in fact be treated as constants of complex type, they will also be treated hyper-
intensionally. For example, letting them be of type 〈0〉, a move which may be
argued for on independent grounds having to do with the treatment of plural-
ity, will make them start to act as naming individual concepts and substitution
problems with them will be avoided.
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